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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—oooOooo— 
CARRIE JO LAW, : BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. : Docket No. 890033-CA 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, : Priority No. 14(b) 
Defendant/Respondent, : 
M. LYNNE LARSON, : 
Intervenor/Appellant. : 
--- oooOooo—-
PARTIES 
All parties to this action appear in the caption of this Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the District Court that 
dismissed Appellant M. Lynne Larson's Complaint in Intervention in this matter. 
Appellant Larson sought to intervene in a garnishment action that had been initiated 
by Respondent Carrie Jo Law to enforce a judgment entered in her favor against 
Robert Law, her former husband, for monies owed, but not paid, pursuant to a 
Decree of Divorce. Respondent's Amended Complaint in Intervention alleges she 
is entitled to the funds to be garnished either as the true owner of those funds or as 
the beneficiary of a resulting trust. 
ISSUES 
Respondent accepts Appellant's Statement of Issues. (App. Br. at 2.) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The determinative statutory authority is set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) as follows: 
61-2-10. Restriction on commissions - Affiliation with 
more than one broker. 
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent 
to accept valuable consideration for the performance of 
any of the acts specified in this chapter from any person 
except the principal broker with whom he is affiliated 
and licensed. An inactive licensee is not authorized to 
conduct real estate transactions until he becomes 
affiliated with a licensed principal broker. No sales 
agent or associate broker may affiliate with more than 
one principal broker at the same time. Except as 
provided by rule, a principal broker may not be 
responsible for more than one real estate brokerage at 
the same time. 
61-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensation restricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in 
any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, 
fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other 
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than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was 
duly licensed as a principal broker at the time of the act 
or rendering the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in 
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or 
compensation for services as a sales agent or associate 
broker unless the action is against the principal broker 
with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the 
recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation 
may only be instituted and brought by the principal 
broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is 
affiliated. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The chronology of events set forth in the "Statement of the Case" 
section of Appellant's brief is undisputed. For the purposes of the motion before 
the District Court and this appeal only, all facts set forth in Intervenor's Amended 
Complaint in Intervention and in her Affidavit may be considered as true. 
Respondent's former husband, Robert Law, is a licensed real estate 
broker doing business as Acres West Real Estate. (Complaint in Intervention at f 2, 
reproduced in Addendum at A-3.) Intervenor Lynne Larson is a licensed real estate 
sales associate, or agent, affiliated with Acres West Real Estate. Id. 
Respondent Carrie Jo Law sought to enforce her judgment against 
Robert Law, obtained April 27, 1988, through Writs of Execution served on several 
title companies through which Robert Law was believed to be doing business as a 
real estate broker. (R. at 100-122.) Some of the funds due Robert Law as broker 
resulted from sales for which Appellant Larson was responsible and, accordingly, will 
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be due a commission from Robert Law. (Larson Affidavit, reproduced in Addendum 
at A-2.) The funds at issue are being held by the garnishee title companies. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Order entered by the District Court is correct and is supported 
by both the undisputed facts and the law. The facts upon which 
Intervenor/Appellant bases her claim are not disputed and, upon those facts, her 
claim must fail Appellant Larson has no legal claim to commissions against any 
person or entity except her broker. Both relevant statutes and well-established 
agency law preclude Intervenor's recovery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT Is APPELLANT/INTERVENOR HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY 
FACTUAL DISPUTE WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE LOWER COURT'S 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION, 
Whether the Court ruled on this matter as a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b) or as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court recognized that there was no factual dispute as 
to the basis of the Intervenor's alleged claims. She is a real estate agent who sold 
some properties. Defendant Robert Law is her broker. Respondent Carrie Jo Law 
has validly garnished funds payable to Robert Law held by several title companies. 
Some of these funds resulted from sales arranged by Intervenor. 
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The question is not a factual one. It is a legal one: under these 
undisputed facts, which party is legally entitled to the money? The District Court, 
presented with these facts, correctly ruled in favor of Plaintiff/Respondent Carrie Jo 
LaWe A thorough review of her Brief reveals that Intervenor has failed to raise any 
factual dispute or question that would alter the legal relationships of the parties. 
The District Judge had before him all facts legally relevant to a decision and his 
ruling was neither premature nor uninformed. 
POINT II; INTERVENOR, A REAL ESTATE AGENT, HAS CLAIMS ONLY 
AGAINST HER BROKER FOR COMMISSIONS AND, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
FUNDS HELD BY THE GARNISHEE, HAS NO CLAIM. 
In her Complaint for Intervention, M. Lynne Larson essentially 
argues that she is a real estate agent acting through Acres West Real Estate, that 
she has commissions due from three separate transactions while acting as an agent 
of Acres West Real Estate, and that, although the garnished funds remain at the title 
company, she is entitled to direct payment of those funds from the title company on 
the basis that those funds are her separate property and not subject to any claims 
that anyone might have against her broker, Robert Law d/b/a Acres West Real 
Estate. Ms. Larsons' position is contrary to Utah law. 
Payment of real estate commissions is governed by Chapter 2 of 
Title 61 of the Utah Code. Section 61-2-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
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amended), makes very clear that a real estate agent may only be paid by the broker 
and not by the title company or any other individual: 
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to 
accept valuable consideration for the performance of any 
of the acts specified in this chapter from any person 
except the principal broker with whom he is affiliated 
and licensed. 
Section 61-2-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The "acts specified in 
this chapter" include the listing and sale of real estate. 
That the agent has a claim only against the broker is also evident 
in from Section 61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which provides: 
Actions for recovery of compensation restricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in 
any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, 
fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other 
than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was 
duly licensed as a principal broker at the time of the act 
or rendering the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in 
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or 
compensation for services as a sales agent or associate 
broker unless the action is against the principal broker 
with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the 
recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation 
may only be instituted and brought by the principal 
broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is 
affiliated. 
Clearly, a sales agent, such as the Intervenor in this action, is precluded from seeking 
recovery for commissions earned from anyone except his or her broker. 
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Not only is the statute clear on its face, the Utah Supreme Court 
has strictly construed the statute and its application. This strict construction is 
apparent in both cases relied upon by Intervenor in her Brief of Appellante In 
Global Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980), the Court 
found a broker-agent relationship to exist between Plaintiff and a principal of an 
entity (AID) which had entered into a partnership doing business as Cedar Hills 
Development Company (the named Defendant). The Court began its analysis by 
emphasizing that a real estate agent can, by statute sue only the broker: 
[A] licensed real estate salesman has the right to 
institute an action against a broker "with whom [he] is 
connected" "for services as a real estate salesman," §61-
2-18(b). The statute does not require that the salesman 
be employed by such broker . . . . Plaintiffs' claim 
based on the . . . transaction therefore meets the 
requirements of §61-2-18. 
614 P.2d at 158. The Court then found that, under the unusual facts then before it, 
there was a principal-broker/sales-agent relationship between one of the Defendant's 
partners and the Plaintiff agent. (Id.) The Plaintiffs recovery was allowed solely 
upon that principal-broker/sales-agent relationship. The case does not recognize, 
indeed it clearly denies, any direct claim on behalf of a sales/agent against the 
owner. 
In Global, the Utah Supreme Court determined the statute to be 
controlling and its terms met by Plaintiff. The Global decision is consistent with the 
Court's prior holding in Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 875 (Utah 1953), also cited by 
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Intervenor/Appellant. In Young, an agent only loosely associated with a broker, 
sought to bring an action directly against a seller for commissions due. The trial 
court, recognizing the inability of the agent to sue a seller directly for commissions, 
joined the broker as an involuntary Plaintiff to the action and entered judgment for 
the Plaintiff agent. Although Young was decided under prior law, on appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court looked to the predecessor of the current statute and stated: 
The necessary implication of Section 82-2-10-that a 
salesman may not sue anyone other than his employing 
broker for his commission-was expressly established as 
law in 1951 by a legislative addition to Title 82 which 
provided that any action to recover a fee or commission 
must be instituted and brought by the broker under 
whom the salesman is employed. (See Section 61-2-18, 
U.C.A.1953.) This same provision prohibits any person 
or association from bringing an action for the recovery 
of any commission for any act done, which is prohibited 
under the provision of this act to other than licensed real 
estate brokers, unless such persons are duly licensed 
under such act as real estate broker at the time such act 
or service was rendered. 
259 P.2d at 878. 
Although it recognized that the agent, who had in fact located the 
ultimate buyer of the Defendant's property, would not be paid, the Court concluded 
that the statutory mandate prevailed and equitable arguments be held inapplicable 
if the statute would otherwise be abrogated. In language equally applicable to the 
present case, the Court reasoned: 
Doubtless plaintiff rendered some measure of service 
resulting in [the buyer's] purchase of defendant's 
property. It has long been established in this 
jurisdiction, however, that a broker or agent may recover 
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only by virtue of contract and cannot recover upon the 
basis of quantum meruit. 
259 P.2d at 877 (citations omitted.) Further, the Court went on to recognize that 
with regard to commissions, the agent "was prevented by statute from having an 
interest in his own right." 259 P.2d at 878. Just as in Young, Intervenor's assertion 
in this case that she is the beneficial "owner" of the funds held by the title companies 
is contrary to statutory law. The Utah Legislature has determined that a real estate 
agent is entitled to compensation only from her broker. Her compensation is based 
upon a percentage of the commission paid to the broker, but she is not entitled to 
compensation directly from the seller or the title companies. Real estate 
commissions belong to the broker. It is then up to the broker to pay the agent. 
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Young, supra, without the broker, the agent is 
entitled to nothing. 
The Utah courts have consistently recognized that pursuant to 
legislative mandate, a real estate agent has a claim only against the broker for 
commissions earned. The court has rejected arguments which would result in the 
abrogation of Section 61-2-18(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The 
Court, too, must uphold the statute and must affirm the lower court's dismissal of 
Intervenor's claim. 
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POINT III: NO RESULTING TRUST IS CREATED BY THE PRINCIPAL/AGENT 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERVENOR AND ROBERT LAW AND 
INTERVENOR'S CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED. 
In addition to claiming an ownership interest in the garnished funds, 
Intervenor argues that the commissions held by the title companies are subject to a 
resulting trust in her favor. Although a creative argument, the equitable concept of 
the resulting trust, in this context, is misapplied. 
The essentials of resulting trusts were concisely stated by the New 
Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of Moses v. Moses, 53 A.2d 805, 40 
NJ. Eq. 575 (1947): 
A trust of this class arises where property is transferred 
under circumstances which give rise to an inference that 
the person who made the transfer or causes it to be 
made does not intend the transferee to take beneficial 
interest in the property; and there are properly but three 
divisions of the class: (1) where an express trust fails in 
whole or in part; (2) where an express trust is fully 
performed without exhausting the trust res; and (3) 
where the purchase price of the property is paid by one 
person and at his direction the vendor conveys the 
property to another person. 
53 A.2d at 807. The facts of this case do not give rise to the creation of a resulting 
trust. Although Intervenor provided services giving rise to the debt to the broker, 
Robert Law, she did not transfer property to Robert Law or cause such property to 
be transferred without Robert Law taking a beneficial interest. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court in the case of Traywick v. 
Wannamaker, 150 S.E. 655, 153 S.C. 146 (1929), was presented with a situation 
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parallel to that presented by this case. There, a medical doctor attending to an 
individual who had sustained personal injuries claimed to be the beneficiary of a 
resulting trust when the person sustaining the personal injuries obtained a judgment 
in a personal injury action where the medical expenses constituted an element of the 
damages. The Court found the elements of a resulting trust not to be present and 
it was up to the medical doctor to pursue his claims as an ordinary creditor holding: 
[Tjhere is no proof of a resulting trust. Such a trust 
cannot be said to be raised by implication or 
construction of law, or be presumed to exist or arise, out 
of the transaction touching the parties involved in this 
litigation; and there is no fact connected with the case 
which establishes, or tends to establish, a resulting trust. 
There is no proof that Wannamaker was placed in a 
fiduciary position with regard to the fund involved, or 
that he in any way practiced a fraud on the litigants 
involved in the case, or that he gained any advantage 
over them, which would tend to establish a trust relation. 
150 S.E.2d at 660. Intervenor stands in the same position with regard to the funds 
at issue as the physician with regard to the funds paid pursuant to the personal injury 
judgment. 
Intervenor essentially asks this Court to create a non-possessory lien 
on all monies due a principal or employer for payment of commissions or salary to 
an agent or employee. That is not the law. An employee does not have a lien on 
an employer's accounts receivable unless a judgment has previously been entered in 
favor of the employee and the employee has levied execution. Nor does an agent 
have a lien on the principal's accounts receivable. In the context of real estate 
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agents, such a lien would be contrary to Section 61-2-18(2) because to foreclose such 
a lien would necessitate filing suit, which action is specifically precluded. 
An agent's rights are not determined by the law of trusts, but rather 
y the specific statutes previously relied upon herein and by the law of agency. Any 
lien an agent may have in this context is limited only to a possessory lien for 
reimbursement or compensation.1 
lrThe general rule as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, §464 
provides: 
When Agent Has Lien 
(a) an agent has a right to retain possession of 
money, goods, or documents of the principal, of which 
he has gained possession in the proper execution of his 
agency, until he is paid the amount due him from the 
principal as compensation for services performed or as 
indemnity for money advanced or liability incurred by 
him in connection with such things; 
(b) a factor, banker, or attorney°at-law has the 
further right to retain possession of money, goods, or 
documents until he is paid the amount due him upon the 
general balance of accounts created by transactions 
conducted by him as such factor, banker, or attorney; 
(c) a factor who has made advances or incurred 
liability with respect to goods received by him for sale 
has a right to sell them contrary to directions of the 
principal, after notice to the principal, if the reasonable 
protection of the factor's interest so requires; 
(d) an agent to whom goods have been consigned but 
not received, and who advances money in anticipation of 
their receipt, has a right to their possession and 
thereafter, under the circumstances stated in Clauses (a), 
(b), and (c), to the rights therein stated; and 
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In Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), our Supreme 
Court rejected equitable arguments where they are contrary to a clear statutory 
mandate. In the context of this case, the funds held by the title companies belong 
to the broker. The agent can sue the broker for her commission, as in the case of 
Global Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d 105 (Utah 1980), but she can 
sue neither the seller nor the title company. Because the agent, Intervener herein, 
cannot sue, she has no legal claim to the funds and she is simply a creditor of her 
broker in line to be paid. This was the conclusion of the District Court in this case 
and the dismissal of Appellant's Amended Complaint in Intervention must be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court had before it, as undisputed, all facts legally 
relevant to a decision regarding the validity of the Intervenor's claims to the funds 
at issue. The trial judge appropriately ruled that a real estate agent, in the absence 
of the broker's insolvency and the pendency of a bankruptcy petition, stands in line 
with other creditors claiming entitlement to garnishable assets of the broker. The 
funds at issue are in the hands of title companies. Intervenor can make no 
(e) an attorney of record who has obtained a 
judgment has an interest therein, as security for his fees 
in the case and for proper payments made and liabilities 
incurred during the course of the proceedings. 
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possessory claim nor does she have a judgment against the broker upon which she 
has levied execution. Given the facts already asserted by Intervenor, there is no 
additional proof Intervener could make which would change the legal relationship 
of the parties. Based upon the undisputed facts, the statutes recited above, and the 
law of agency, this Court must affirm the decision of the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^O^dav of May, 1989. 
PARKEN & KECK 
By ^Wcu t^ i tu -C , 
Marcella L. Keck 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Original Signature 
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ELDON A. ELIASON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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864-2515 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE JO LAW SIDDIQI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FRANK LAW 
Defendint 
A F F I D A V I T 
C i v i l No. 7860 
STATE OF UTAH I 
) ss 
COUNTY OF MILLARD ) 
M. Lynne Larson, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes 
and says that she is a real estate agent working for and with 
Acres West and has been so engaged for two years. M. Lynne Larson 
listed and sold tne property which closed on the 21st of June 
1983. referred to as Sannes .ChemExec property. i hat she as sales 
agent is tonally -responsible for the sale and listing ot the said 
orouertv ana as a resjit thereof has a commission and an expense 
f-cm the proceeds being held by Utah Title Comoany. 
That Carrie Jo Law Siddiqi has filed a Writ ot Garnishment 
against the said funds, none of whicn belongs to \cres West except 
$468, the balance to M. Lynne Larson, OF $702.00 
Dated June 30, 1988. * • , /? /•; 
TT. L/mie Larson' 
v 
Subscribed and sworn to before me tnis 30ih day o,c June, 198« 
V \^:_J./ 
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BBB0CT3I WC--07 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CARRIE JO LAW, 
Plaintiff, 
VSc 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Defendant, 
M. LYNNE LARSON, 
Intervenor. 
AMENDED 
COMPLAINT IN 
INTERVENTION 
Civil No. 7860 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Intervenor in the above-entitled action who 
complains of Plaintiff and for causes of action alleges as 
follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were previously husband and wife, 
and are now divorced. 
2. Intervenor is a licensed real estate sales associate 
affiliated with Acres West Real Estate, a real estate agency owned 
A-l 
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by Defendant herein, as Real Estate Broker. 
3. Over the last several months, Intervenor has listed and 
sold three properties for which Security Title Company of Millard 
County and/or Utah Title Company has handled the title work and 
closings. 
4. That she is due, from the funds held by Security Title 
and/or Utah Title, commissions as follows: from transaction no. 
87EM026, the sum of $742.50, from transaction no. 88EM023, the sum 
of $486.00 and from transaction no. 88EM028, the sum of $1140.00. 
5. On or about June 21, 1988 Plaintiff caused to be served 
upon Security Title of Millard County and Utah Title writs of 
garnishment in an attempt to garnish funds due from Security Title 
of Millard County and Utah Title to Defendant herein. 
6. Plaintiff has claimed, through various motions filed with 
this Court, and claims made with Security Title of Millard County 
and Utah Title, that she is due all sums to be paid by Security 
Title of Millard County and/or Utah Title to Acres West Real 
Estate Agency, including those amounts due to Intervenor as a 
result of listing and/or sales of real estate. 
7. The commissions due to Intervenor as aforesaid are the 
sole property of Intervenor and are not subject to garnishment or 
execution by Plaintiff or any other person claiming to be a 
creditor of Defendant. 
iiiou0n« Jonts, 
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8. Intervenor is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the 
commissions earned by her are her own separate property and not 
subject to the claims of any other party hereto. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Intervenor re-alleges paragraphs 1-8 of her first cause of 
action as though they were fully set forth herein. 
2. Acres West Realty, in addition to its business of selling 
homes, acts as a rental agent for certain rental properties in the 
Millard County area, which properties are owned by absentee 
landlords. 
3. Intervenor is due, as the leasing agent on certain of 
those properties, the sum of $608.41, which amount was due and 
payable from Defendant's general account in his bank. 
4. Plaintiff has caused a writ of garnishment to be issued 
against Defendant's bank, holding his general account, including 
the amounts owed to intervenor. 
5. Intervenor is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the 
commissions earned by her are her own separate property and not 
subject to the claims of any other party hereto, 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Intervenor re-alleges paragraphs 1-8 of her first cause of 
action and 1-5 of her second cause of action as though fully set 
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forth herein. 
2. Defendant herein, by operation of law, is a de facto 
trustee, and Intervenor is a de facto beneficiary, of a resulting 
trust whereby Defendant has come in to certain property conveyed 
to him as the result of the efforts of Intervenor. 
3. Because of the resulting trust, the amounts claimed by 
Intervenor herein as set forth above, are sole and separate 
property of Intervenor and are not subject to the garnishment or 
other execution actions of Plaintiff herein 
WHEREFORE, Intervenor prays judgment as follows: 
1. For a declaratory judgment that funds due to her as earned 
commissions as a sales associate with Acres West Real Estate are 
her own personal property and not subject to garnishment or 
execution by either Plaintiff or Defendant herein. 
2. For an order of this Court directing Plaintiff to cease 
and desist from her efforts to garnish or execute on commissions 
due to Intervenor. 
3. For a declaratory judgment that Intervenor is owed the sum 
of $2368.50 as commissions from transactions 87EM026, 88EM023 and 
88EM028 and that such sums are due and payable upon closing of 
those transactions. 
4. For declaratory judgment that Intervenor is owed the sum 
of $608.41 as rental commissions as rental agent: for absentee 
utlough, Jonas, 
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l a n d l o r d s . 
5. For a d e c l a r a t i o n of a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t upon any monies due 
I n t e r v e n o r a s a r e s u l t of her own l a b o r and an e x e m p t i o n of any 
f u n d s h e l d by D e f e n d a n t i n s u c h a t r u s t from any a c t i o n s by 
P l a i n t i f f to e x e c u t e on De fendant ' s p r o p e r t y . 
6 . For s u c h o t h e r and f u r t h e r r e l i e f a s t h e Court deems 
e q u i t a b l e and proper in the p r e m i s e s . 
DATED t h i s 'J-O V day of October , 1988. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
W. Andrew McCullough / 
Attorney for I n t e r v e n o r / 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e %rf day of O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 8 , I d i d 
mai l a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the above and f o r e g o i n g Complaint 
i n I n t e r v e n t i o n , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o M a r c e l l a L. Keck, A t t o r n e y 
f o r P l a i n t i f f , 9 Exchange P l a c e , S u i t e 8 0 8 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
84111 and t o E l d o n A. E l i a s o n , A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t , P.O. Box 
605, D e l t a , Utah 84620 . 
/ 
/Jl 
lough, Jon**, 
ItMftt 
